By William
D. Hartung and Frida
Berrigan, In
These Times.
May 23, 2007.
While the United States demands that other countries end their
nuclear programs, the Bush administration is busy planning
a new generation of nuclear weapons known as "Complex
2030."
Only days before the fifth anniversary of September 11, President
George W. Bush addressed military officers in Washington to
warn that nuclear-armed terrorists could "blackmail the
free world and spread their ideologies of hate and raise a
moral threat to America."
This alarmist vision was accompanied by the White House's
release of "A National Strategy for Combating Terrorism," which
painted a picture of a "troubling potential WMD terrorism
nexus emanating from Tehran." The administration is building
the case for war against Iran -- a job made easier by President
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's recent announcement that Iran can now
enrich uranium on an industrial scale -- despite the fact that
many Iran-watchers and nuclear experts consider their claims
of enrichment capacity to be an overblown boast.
This is not the first time the "no-nuclear-weapons-for-you" ploy
has been used to lay the groundwork for a war. On Oct. 7, 2002,
while making the case for regime change in Iraq, President
Bush said: "America must not ignore the threat gathering
against us. Facing clear evidence of peril, we cannot wait
for the final proof -- the smoking gun -- that could come in
the form of a mushroom cloud."
Yellow cake, aluminum tubes and histrionics about Saddam Hussein's
nuclear capabilities followed ... all of which were challenged
at the time, and have turned out to be completely fabricated.
And, when not grinding the axe of pre-emptive war as counter-proliferation
strategy, the administration periodically raises the specter
of nuclear terrorism, in the form of dirty bombs and suitcase-sized
warheads.
But while the United States demands that other countries end
their nuclear programs, the Bush administration is busy planning
a new generation of nuclear weapons. Nearly 20 years after
the Berlin Wall crumbled, the United States is allocating more
funding, on average, to nuclear weapons than during the Cold
War.
The Bush administration is pumping this money -- more than
$6 billion this year -- into renovating the nuclear weapons
complex and designing new nuclear weapons. Such hypocrisy is
one of the main obstacles to nuclear arms reductions because
it runs the risk of shattering the 1970 Nuclear Nonproliferation
Treaty in which the nuclear-armed states pledged to begin the
process of disarmament if the non-nuclear states opted not
to pursue the deadly technology.
The centerpiece of the administration's move toward developing
a new generation of nuclear weapons is "Complex 2030," a
multiyear plan introduced last April by the National Nuclear
Security Administration (the semi-autonomous agency within
the Department of Energy that oversees the nuclear weapons
program).
Complex 2030 calls for the construction of new or upgraded
facilities at each of the National Nuclear Security Administration's
eight nuclear weapons-related sites throughout the country.
The plan also calls for building a new nuclear weapon, the
Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW), inside the old warheads.
The program was conceived in response to concerns that the
cores of existing nuclear weapons could be wearing out and
need to be replaced. But RRW development has gone much further
than that.
The Department of Energy (DOE) notes in its summary of Complex
2030 that one of the major goals of the program is to "improve
the capability to design, develop, certify and complete production
of new or adapted warheads in the event of new military requirements." In
short, while the Bush administration has publicly stressed
reductions in nuclear weapons, it is working to produce new,
more usable nuclear weapons.
Three small steps forward
As a candidate for president in 2000, and during his first
months in office, Bush suggested that the United States should
significantly cut its nuclear arsenal. In his first address
before a joint session of Congress, the new president went
so far as to pledge: "We can discard Cold War relics and
reduce our own nuclear forces to reflect today's needs." He
followed through on this promise with the 2002 Strategic Offensive
Reductions Treaty (SORT), which calls for reducing the U.S.
and Russian nuclear arsenals from 6,000 each -- the limit established
under the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty -- to between
1,700 and 2,200 warheads each over a 10-year period.
Presidents Bush and Putin signed the treaty at Konstantin
Palace in St. Petersburg right after the city celebrated its
300th birthday in June 2003. Also known as the Treaty of Moscow,
SORT has serious flaws. It has no method for verifying that
each side is meeting its commitments; the cuts are not permanent
-- neither side is obligated to destroy or dismantle the warheads,
only to take them "off-line;" and both sides would
have to agree to extend the treaty if they have not met their
obligations by the time the treaty expires in 2012. After the
Senate unanimously voted to ratify the treaty, Sen. John Kerry
(D-Mass.) called it "as flimsy a treaty as the Senate
has ever considered." Yet even with these flaws, SORT
establishes important benchmarks and offers the potential of
trust-building between the former superpower rivals.
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